ABSTRACT Attempts to apply the influential Bain-Elsheikh model to annual t in Ireland have produced puzzling results. This paper rejects existing interp economists and offers an alternative explanation which is theoretically and empir strong evidence is found that variations in labour market slackness affect opport evidence that they directly affect employees' or employers' dispositions tow establishes that the peculiarities of labour market and institutional structur provide a severe test of models developed on the basis of the experience of the 
In recent years much debate and res short-run union membership grow specifically on its relationship to the econ business cycle, has focused on the 'BainElsheikh' model, developed in a well-known study of union growth in four countries (Bain and Elsheikh, 1976) . Drawing heavily, if 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 FIGURE 1 Trade union growth in Ireland measured as membership over all employees at work legally entitled to join unions plus the unemployed), and et, a random error term.' The expected signs on the coefficients are as follows:
P1, P2 > 0 > P3, P4
Variations in money wages are held to affect the degree to which potential and existing trade union members credit unions with success in negotiating pay rises. Variations in retail prices are believed to influence employees' propensity to enter or remain in unions through the threa posed to living standards. Thus, the higher the rate of rise in prices, other things being equal, the more unions are held to benefit from the 'threat effect' of inflation. Moreover, rising prices, it is argued, usually reflect business buoyancy, and, as such, APt also captures, a 'prosperity effect': that is, variations in the degree to which employers will possess the power or inclination to resist the spread of unionization. In times of business prosperity employer resistance to unionization will decrease as employers become more concerned to avoid disruption to business and less concerned about the possible effect of unions on costs.
The level and/or the rate of change in unemployment is expected to influence short-run changes in the rate of membership growth because it may affect the costs and benefits associated with joining a union or remaining a union member. Unions may provide few services of value to the unemployed, with the result that the cost of becoming or remaining a member if unemployed may greatly outweigh the benefits. In a slack labour market employers are also more likely to resist unionization and this may increase the cost of joining or remaining in benefit for those in employment. Finally, union growth is expected to be inversely related to the level of union density because, as the latter rises, the marginal cost to unions of recruiting additional members will increase, as well, possibly, as the marginal disinclination of remaining employees to unionize. These factors combine to give the so-called 'saturation effect' imposed by rising density on further membership growth.
Clearly the Bain-Elsheikh basic model cannot claim to be a complete model of annual trade union growth and decline. The model is focused primarily on business-cycle influences which affect short-run variations in aggregate union membership. A complete aggregate-level model would also have to include two other major types of influence. It is reasonably generally established that the probability of being unionized varies in accordance with a variety of socio-demographic factors. For example, workers in large organizations tend, other things being equal, to be more highly unionized than workers in small organizations; blue-collar workers tend to be more highly unionized than white-collar workers; men tend to be more highly unionized than women. These factors aggregate into important differences in levels of unionization between industries. Changes in the distribution of the work-force across industrial groups will then affect the trend in aggregate unionization, depending on the direction those changes take. As such, we can speak of aggregate structural influences on union growth and decline, which of their nature, tend to be marginal from year to year and only to become apparent in the long-run trend of unionization.
Finally, it is also apparent that a variety of institutional influences can affect the trend in union membership. Laws may be passed which either facilitate or hinder the organizing efforts of unions; the primary level at which collective bargaining is conducted in a country might affect the fortunes of unions through its effect on perceptions of union influence. The political composition of the party or parties in government in different periods may also influence unionization. Left-wing and social democratic governments might be expected to be broadly supportive of union power and influence, while liberal and right-wing governments are likely to foster and reflect a more hostile climate for unions.
While the use of a density measure to capture the 'saturation effect' in the Bain-Elsheikh model, takes account of the impact of structural change on union membership, it does so only in a very rough manner. In empirical estimation, much of the impact of structural change is necessarily disguised in the constant term of the model. Similarly, in applications of the model to some countries, Bain and Elsheikh try Sweden (1914 Sweden ( -1970 (Bain Elsheikh, 1976: 87-115) . Given the simonious character of the model and its apparent ability to account for annual union growth and decline in nations with strikingly different trade union traditions, there seems to be no reason a priori why it cannot be used effectively as a baseline model with which to explore influences on trade union growth and decline in Ireland. Constant 10-1381* 12-1839* 9-8396* 10-9113* 9-9902* (3-627) (3-881) (5.567) (7-846) (7.579) Major data problems are encountered in estimating this model in the Irish case. The steps we have followed to resolve these problems, particularly as they affect the dependent variable, are outlined at length in another paper (Roche and Larragy, 1989: 5-9 The first point that has to be noted in this regard is that whereas Bain and Elsheikh suggest that inflation will usually occur in periods of economic prosperity, it appears that in Ireland the opposite has more usually been the case. I 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 It seems advisable, then, to introduce a potential membership variable into the model directly, in order to examine whether it alters the results on the price coefficient, affects the tendency for residuals to cluster and so reduces the risk of bias in the coefficients and of obtaining spurious results.5 A theoretical problem that then arises, however, is how potential trade union membership should be specified. One alternative is to follow If we accept, therefore, that the unemployed cannot be regarded in any significant sense as having formed part of the constituency or potential membership of Irish trade unions over the period covered by this study, it follows that the rate of change in employees at work and not the rate of change in the work-force should be used as a measure of annual changes in potential trade union membership. The narrower definition of potential membership should also, of course, be adopted in defining trade union density.
The importance of this theoretical question becomes clear when models are fitted incorporating alternative potential membership terms and alternative specifications of union density. In the equations reported in Table 2 , AEt and AWFt denote the annual rates of change respectively of employees in employment and the employee work-force; Dt-1 denotes lagged density defined with the employee work-force as 1933-84 1933-84 1930-84 1930-84 Method In models including AEt and DEt-1, the significance of APt is found to be very dependent on the cases or years included in the regressions.
When models including these terms-and omitting the insignificant unemployment term-are fitted over the periods 1932-84, 1931-84, or 1930-84 Bain and Elsheikh propose that the business cycle also, and more interestingly, affects employees' propensity to unionize through its effect on employer and employee behaviour: in times of prosperity employers adopt a softer stance towards unions and employees have less reason to fear that union membership will have negative consequences. Before giving further consideration to these important questions, it is first necessary to deal with further institutional complexities that arise in the Irish case. factors which had an important effect on employees' propensity or opportunity to unionize during the immediate post-war years. It seems to us that the principle of these factors can be identified and their effects accounted for.
However, they are not related to the business cycle in any meaningful sense, and must instead be understood in terms of the effects on early post-war unionization of the manner in which the Irish economy was managed during wartime. The wage freeze introduced during 1941 was replaced by a wage tribunal system in April of the following year. While wage rises were permissible under this system, the tribunals moderated the trend in pay and held increases below the rate of inflation. A sharp acceleration in the rate of inflation during the War thus imposed a sharp squeeze on real wages. It appears that the system of wartime wage control had significant direct and indirect effects on the rate of trade union growth subsequent to its abolition and the return to free collective bargaining in 1946. Specifically, we would distinguish between three related effects of the system of wage control in operation between TABLE 3 Trade union growth in Ireland, 1930 Ireland, -1984 the 'transition effect' dummy, alternative indicat and price trends in periods of 'low' and 'high' unemployment Equation 3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5 Period 1930 Period -84 1930 Period -84 1930 Period -84 1930 Period -84 1932 We have argued that the significant ne price effect obtained by fitting the Elsheikh model to Irish data is spurio important, nonetheless, to consider expli explanation for this unexpected result advanced by Sapsford (1983; 1984) on the basis of his research into Irish trade union growth over the period 1944-77. Sapsford begins by noting the 'very pronounced tendency' for the Irish rate of price inflation to exceed that of the United Kingdom. This being the case, he argues, the resistance of Irish employers to unionization stiffens in periods of inflation due to concern that increased unionization will intensify 'wage push' and result in a deterioration in Ireland's competitiveness vis-a-vis its main trading partner (Sapsford, 1984; 311-312 (Kennedy, 1971: 26-36; McAleese, 1971; McAleese and Martin, 1973) .16 Questions of economics aside, there is no general evidence from research on Irish industrial relations that employers have in fact acted in accordance with such a view of the dangers attendant on the growth of unionization during periods of high inflation. While admittedly such an orientation might not be expected to come to light in any clear or coherent sense, it is often claimed that what has characterized Irish management-at any rate until recently-is, in fact, a pervasive failure to take account of competitiveness; and this can at least be supported by empirical evidence and general information on the conduct of Irish industrial relations over much of the period covered by our paper. O'Brien, 1981) . This latter development meant that for a significant part of the period with which we are concerned a high level of nearly automatic protection against inflation was provided for the majority of employees, whether unionized or not, through the operation of the wage bargaining system.24
If basic pay levels across a wide range of industries were thus protected against inflation, and if this in turn became a firm expectation among employees, the institutional features of pay determination may have reduced the perceived threat posed by rising prices for employees' standard of living. In other words, employees may have become accustomed to the expectation that wage levels would respond to changes in price levels, with a concomitant reduction in the 'threat effect' postulated by Bain and Elsheikh.25 In the same way that the existence of a consistent threat effect must be doubted in the Irish case, so too must Bain and Elsheikh's postulated tendency for employers' propensity to resist unionization and employees' confidence in embracing it, to vary directly with the business cycle. The positive coefficient on AEt may simply indicate that the annual rate of unionization varies in response to variations in opportunity to unionize, as determined by the size of the employed work-force. Stronger evidence is needed if we are to be able to conclude with any confidence that employees' and employers' propensities or attitudinal dispositions towards unionization vary in the manner hypothesized. On the face of it, this evidence cannot be found in the Irish case.
To begin with, if propensities regarding unionization varied in the manner outlined by Bain and Elsheikh, we might expect the coefficient on AEt to be greater than unity: that is, we might expect the rate of union growth to recover more sharply than the rate of employment growth in the upswing of the cycle and the opposite to occur in the downswing. But irrespective of how union growth equations are specified, AEt consistently remains below unity.
Further negative results are obtained when we introduce a profits term into the equation in an attempt to provide a more sensitive measure of variations in business buoyancy.26 Sapsford found that the level of real profits had a significant effect on union growth in Ireland in the period 1943-77 and this finding was underscored by Smyth's analysis of Irish union growth over the period 1946-77 (Sapsford, 1984: 314-315; Smyth, 1985: 200-201 This study has established that annual variations in employment, that is, in net job gains or losses, significantly influence the rate of trade union growth but that the annual level of unemployment has no effect. Using Sapsford's data, Smyth (1985) con- back from, the United Kingdom. Smyth hypothesizes that the higher the Irish unemployment rate relative to that of the UK (UI-UKt), the higher will be the level of migration out of the Irish work-force and the greater the drag exerted on Irish union growth. One obvious reason why the level of, or rate of change in, unemployment per se is found to have no significant effect on the rate of trade union growth in Ireland may be that measured unemployment is a poor indicator of labour market slackness due to migration flows. Looked at in this sense, Smyth's variable, UI-UKt, can be seen to represent a measure of the level of unemployment in Ireland adjusted for the 'migratory pull' exerted by UK economic conditions. Irrespective of whether the con- gested that the rate of unemployment coloured employees' disposition towards unionization; in times of high unemployment people were deterred from joining unions by fear of employer hostility and a sense of general union ineffectiveness. The Irish rate of unemployment probably had little subjective effect on employees. The institutional character of wage bargainin
The system of wage bargaining in Ireland the Second World War has been character by a well-developed pattern of inclusive w rounds. In periods when rounds were under way the bargaining activity of unions in different sectors of the labour market was highly synchronized. Given the institutional importance of the round system in Irish wage bargaining, it seems worthwhile to test whether the incidence of rounds per se may have exerted an influence on trade union growth, irrespective of the levels of pay increases unions were negotiating. Several dummy variables were used to test for a distinct institutional wage round effect on Irish trade union growth (for details see Roche and Larragy, 1989: 44) . The results suggested that the wage round system exerted no distinct institutional effect on union growth, separable from the effect of wage rises. When a simple wage round dummy R is introduced into a model which includes a wage term (equation 6.3 of Period 1943-84 1943-84 1930-84 1930-84 Method (1-504) indications that it was extensive-at any rate, under the 1970s 'generation' of national wage deals.34
Conceptual problems arise in testing for a bargaining structure effect on Irish trade union growth and these are outlined elsewhere (Roche and Larragy, 1989: 47 The political composition of government Several studies of trade union growth ha investigated whether the political composition of parliaments or governments has affected trad union growth (Ashenfelter and Pencavel, 196 Schnabel, 1987; Armingeon, 1988; Carruth an Disney, 1988) . The degree to which the complexion of government influences union growth will depend for the most part on the character of the political cleavages that distinguish the party systems of different nations.
This being so, there are good reasons to expect Period 1930-84 1930-84 1930-84 1930- around 'class politics'. While a case could be made that the Irish Labour Party has followed a distinct and class-focused policy on industrial relations matters, the fact that Labour has entered government only as a minor coalition partner has meant that in practice it has had to operate within, or in tension with, lines of policy pursued by one of the major parties. Two 'political effect' dummies were tested in our preferred model. The first was assigned a value of unity for years in which the Labour Party participated in coalition governments and in the case of the year 1932 when Labour supported a minority Fianna Fail government; the second was assigned a value of unity for years in which these governments had been in power for more than six months. The results were similar in both It is still open whether workers involved or working days lost represents the best indicator of the level of strike activity as it affects trade union growth. The number of workers involved in strikes each year seems preferable in that it measures the annual incidence of worker experience of strike activity. Working days lost should nonetheless be examined as well in that it is a more parsimonious indicator of the overall volume of strike activity. Irrespective of the indicator used (equation 7.3 presents the results when worker involvement, WIt, is introduced into the model), the results fail to confirm the hypothesis and strike activity is revealed as having no significant effect on Irish trade union growth. the case of union density is also considered, as is possibility that the effect of prices on union growth be moderated at higher levels of inflation (Bain and Elsheikh, 1976: 68-71) . 2. Autocorrelated residuals render tests of significance unreliable and can affect parameter estimates and R2s. The problem of autocorrelation in time series and the Cochrane-Orcutt procedure are discussed in Ostrom (1978: 20-41) . 3. The usual tests indicate that this finding cannot be accounted for by multicollinearity between wages and prices, though the zero-order correlation between these variables is nevertheless high, r = 0-72. (On the problem of multicollinearity, see Lewis-Beck, 1980: 58-63.) 4. In all the countries examined by Bain and Elsheikh, zero-order correlations between the rate of price inflation and the level of unemployment are negative. In the Irish case, however, a positive coefficient (r = 0.225) is obtained.
5. As we saw, Bain and Elsheikh seek to allow for the impact on union membership of changes in 'potential membership' by means of a lagged density term (Dt-1). In deciding against the inclusion of an explicit potential membership term, Bain and Elsheikh departed from the practice adopted in earlier econometric research (Ashenfelter and Pencavel, 1969; Sharpe, 1971) . Their primary reason for omitting a term allowing directly for the impact on union growth of variations in potential union membership seems to have been that their British labour force data before 1948 were derived by means of linear interpolation of decennial Census of Population data, with the result that a variable constructed from them would exhibit little year-to-year variation (Bain and Elsheikh, 1976: 67-68) . In the Irish case we were able to derive a more reliable indicator of annual changes in the employee work-force than could be obtained by linear interpolation (see Appendix 1). Bain and Elsheikh (1976: 37-39 ) also underscore Mancke's well-known criticism of Ashenfelter and Pencavel's use of potential membership as a regressor.
In essence the argument is that the coefficient on such a term can be of little interest in that it is almost definitional that a change in potential membership, ceteris paribus, will lead to an equal proportional change in union membership. This argument, however, should not be accepted uncritically, particularly in the Irish case. First of all, as has been argued, the omission of such a term might result in other terms proxying effects other than those they were included to measure, leading to biassed coefficients and spurious results. Second, the coefficient on the potential membership term might range from below to above unity-the coefficient implied by Mancke's criticism-producing interpretable and possibly important results.
Finally, where we have reason to believe that the measured rate of unemployment is a poor indicator of labour market slackness, a potential membership term might be expected to pick up more directly the postulated effect of variations in the labour market on union growth.
6. The possibility of non-linear relationships between density and the rate of union growth was examined in detail. On theoretical grounds and following earlier research, we tested inverse and quadratic functional forms of the density variable (see Roche and Larragy, 1989: 56-57 13. The calculated F ratio obtained from a comparison of equations 2.4 and 3.1 is 64-9, and this greatly exceeds the theoretical F value of 7-19 at the 99 per cent level of probability. It can be suggested that the three factors we believe to have given rise to a transition effect followed, so to speak, different 'trajectories of decay'. This renders it difficult to select a formal decay function that might best model the attenuation of the transition effect. (For a discussion of this issue, see Roche and Larragy, 1989: 24.) 14. Indeed, the competitiveness of Irish exports on the UK market increased sharply during this period (see Conniffe and Kennedy, 1984: Ch. 6 16. McAleese and Martin (1973: 45) Management Institute survey of management (Tomlin, 1966) . 18. Sapsford (1984: 313) 22. Given that the mean and median unemployment rates are practically the same, the results are similar regardless of which measure is used to distinguish between inflationary and stagflationary price rises.
Similar results are obtained when the mean and median of AEt (1930-84) are used to define inflationary and stagflationary price terms.
Following
Bain and Elsheikh, we tested for the possibility that inflation might be related to union growth in a non-linear manner, such that higher rates of inflation exert a smaller or greater impact on union growth than lower rates. The results, however, were negative. 24. It could be argued that the features of wage determination that we have described imply that Irish employees have focused their wage bargaining activity on real wages, with the result that any 'credit effect' enjoyed by unions has depended on trends in real rather than money wages. The results obtained when real wage variables are introduced into the preferred model fail to provide support for this hypothesis. Neither A(W/P)t or AW-APt attain significance at the 95 per cent level. The results obtained when A(W/P)t is introduced into the model suggested that union growth has benefited from a degree of 'money illusion' or perhaps from the fact that wage rises have proved more salient to some employees than price rises. It should be noted that when an F test is applied to a linear restriction imposed on money wage trends and inflation, the restriction is rejected at the 95 per cent level but cannot be rejected at the 99 per cent level. Similar results are obtained for A(W/P)t and AW-APt. 25. This explanation is not entirely satisfactory, however.
While it is certainly plausible that trade union members may have become accustomed to such an expectation, with the result that, other things being equal, they were no more likely to remain union members in times of high inflation than at other times, the bearing of this hypothesis on the propensity of potential members to join unions appears a good deal more remote. The hypothesis may reasonably be extended-though somewhat tenuously-to the behaviour of potential trade union members employed in industries covered by unionized bargaining units. It becomes plausible in other industries only if it can be assumed that pay rises here too were transparently influenced by trends in the cost of living. This seems unlikely but, in any event, cannot be assessed empirically due to the paucity of studies of sectoral developments in Irish industrial relations. 26. In a later analysis of union growth in the UK, Bain and Elsheikh found that the rate of change in real profits had a significant effect on union growth over the period for which data were available (1893-1913 and 1920-65) , without altering appreciably the explanatory significance of other terms in their model (see Elsheikh and Bain, 1979 Roche and Larragy (1989: 39-40 tier of pay bargaining (Fogarty et al., 1981) . The case load of the Labour Court also increased dramatically during the 1970s, partly in response to union claims relating to the anomaly and productivity provisions of successive agreements. 35. When a dummy confined to the 1970's generation of national agreements is tested, it retains a negative sign but is even more insignificant. 
Civilian Employees at Work (E)
A variety of sources and methods were used to derive estimates of E and thus of AE. Again a detailed discussion of how the series was constructed will be found in Roche and Larragy, op. cit. The principles applied in developing the employees at work series are outlined below. From these estimates were subtracted data on numbers in the Gardai and defence forces. Data on numbers of personnel in the permanent defence forces were obtained from The Statistical Abstract (1930 Abstract ( -1939 , the Department of Defence (1945 Defence ( -1984 and a variety of other sources , principally, Robert Fisk, In Time of War: Ireland, Ulster and the Price of Neutrality 1939 -45 (London, Paladin, 1985 . Data on the strength of the Gardai were obtained from The Department of Justice (1939 Justice ( -1984 and The Statistical Abstract (1930-38) . Ireland, 1938 -1970 (Dublin, ESRI, 1973 , Table  A 
Wages (W)
The earnings series was constructed of necessity from several sources. For the period 1931-39 the only wage series available covered rates per hour paid to wage earners in 23 industrial occupations. As the hours of work of those covered by this early survey did not change to any significant degree over the period, the data are a reasonable indicator of weekly rates. Problems arise, however, in using these data and in regard to their consistency with the data on earnings used for the remainder of the period covered by the study.
First of all, the wage rates related, in the words of the survey, to the 'beginning of the year'. As such, it seemed advisable to regard the index rate given for each year as more properly pertaining to the previous year. This procedure was followed in assigning values to the years 1931-39. Second, it might be questioned whether these data on wage rates are consistent with data for the period from 1940 on earnings. Given the under-developed state of collective bargaining during the 1930s and the dominance of industrylevel and district bargaining structures in the period before the Second World War, it seems reasonable to assume that wage rate data is an acceptable measure of the trend in 
Retail Prices (P)
The prices series used in this study were obtained by linking together the cost of living index , 'interim cost of living index ' (1947-52) and consumer price index . The institutional character of wage bargaining (R and variants) Scoring on the reported simple wage-round incidence dummy:
Zero 1930-45; 1953-54; 1963; 1965 One 1946 1955-62; 1964; 1966-84 The main sources used for information on wage rounds
were David O'Mahony, Economic Aspects of Industrial
